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Ohio admits illegally obtained evidence in criminal cases.30 California and
some twenty other states31 are committed to complete opposition to illegal searches
by following the federal rule of inadmissibility. 32 These jurisdictions condemn a
police search without warrant by rejecting evidence that would convict a felon.
To allow the same sort of evidence, this time obtained by city officials, to be used
to deprive a householder of his property is completely inconsistent and would strike
a strange note.
The theory of the exclusionary rule should have full weight in any case involv-
ing an unauthorized search since its purpose is to prevent persons with govern-
mental authority from infringing upon the citizens' constitutional rights.3 3 The
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Little case disposed of the problem succinctly:
34
It is said to us that therefore there is no prohibition against searches of private homes
by government officers, unless they are searching for evidence of crime; that if they are
searching for evidence of crime they must get a search warrant, but if they are search-
ing for something else or are just searching, they need not get a search warrant; for
searchers of the latter sort, we are told, homeowners must open their front doors upon
demand of an officer without warrant. The argument is wholly without merit, pre-
posterous in fact....
Statutes conferring the right of entry over the occupant's objections, even if
limited to reasonable hours and to occasions when the occupants are present, are
unconstitutional. They violate both the letter and spirit of federal and state con-
stitutional guaranties against unreasonable searches. Health, housing and fire
inspectors are not all benevolent public servants. They too can be malicious, vin-
dictive, vexatious, arbitrary, unreasonable. Even criminally corrupt. The police
are not the only officers capable of harrassing the homeowner. The health and
safety man has enormous authority under the codes and, in many instances, his
hold over the occupant will even be greater than that of the police.
In our modern times hardly a voice is heard in opposition to reasonable health
and safety measures. With the growth of cities and their necessary bureaucracies,
there is often the tendency to attempt to do too much, to cover all the loopholes,
to meet all possible situations. In our goal to protect the "public welfare" we
should not lose sight of our traditional concern for individual civil liberties lest
we legislate them away for all time.
Dimitri K. Ilyin
CONTRACTS: PRoMIssoRY ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO A COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION
IN CALIORNIA
The frequent misunderstandings and erroneous application of the familiar text
book case of Baird v. Gimblel have given rise to much confusion with respect to
the correct application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The case is generally
considered to represent a limitation upon that doctrine and is interpreted as stand-
ing for the proposition that promissory estoppel has no application to a commercial
30 State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490 (1936).
31 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). A list of exclusionary states is
to be found in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 38 (1949). Delaware, Texas, North Carolina and
California have adopted the exclusionary rule since the Wolf case.
82 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
83Ibid.
84 178 F.2d at 16.
164 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
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transaction. Whether followed, criticized or merely cited, it is apparent that many
writers as well as courts have construed the able opinion of Judge Learned Hand
too broadly.
2
In a well reasoned opinion, Mr. Justice Traynor of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia has reached a result contrary to that of Hand in Baird v. Gimble. The case
is Drennan v. Star Paving Co.,3 and it is significant because it is the first to apply
promissory estoppel specifically to an implied promise to hold an offer open with
the result that the offer is irrevocable.
The facts in the case were as follows. On July 28, 1955, plaintiff, a general con-
tractor, was preparing a bid on a school job for which bids were to be submitted
before 8 p.m. that day. Late that afternoon an estimator for defendant, as was the
custom of the trade, phoned in a bid for the paving work on the project. Since de-
fendant's bid, $7,131.60, was the lowest received by plaintiff for the paving, he
entered it together with defendant's name in his master cost sheet thus incorporat-
ing it into his bid on the entire project. When the bids were opened, plaintiff's
proved to be lowest and he was awarded the contract. The following morning plain-
tiff stopped at defendant's office and met defendant's construction engineer who in-
formed plaintiff that his firm had erred in its bid for the paving work and that
it could not do the work for the price bid. Defendant refused to do the work for
less than $15,000 and plaintiff, after several months search for a low bid, engaged
another firm to do the work for $10,948.60.
The trial court found that defendant had made a definite bid and that plaintiff
had used it in compiling his own bid for the school job. Accordingly, it entered
judgment in favor of plaintiff for the difference between defendant's bid and the
cost to plaintiff of having the paving done by the other firm.
Defendant appealed claiming that its offer was revocable and that it had re-
voked before plaintiff had accepted. Plaintiff contended that he had relied upon
defendant's offer to his detriment and that defendant should respond in damages
for its refusal to perform.
All other questions having been disposed of, the issue resolved itself to one
of promissory estoppel. Did plaintiff's detrimental reliance on defendant's offer
make the offer irrevocable?
In reaching the conclusion that the offer was irrevocable, the court relied upon
the doctrine of promissory estoppel as stated in section 90 of the Restatement of
Contracts. "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce ac-
tion or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the prom-
isee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."' 4 Mr. Justice Traynor noted
that the rule as therein stated is law in California 5 and concluded that defendant's
2 See Gordon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Patent Licensing Corp.
v. Olsen, 71 F. Supp. 181 (S.D. N.Y. 1947); Schafer v. Fraser, 206 Ore. 479, 290 P.2d 190
(1955) ; Daum Construction Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952) ; 28 11. L.R. 419
(1933); 98 U. PA. L. REv. 459 (1950).
8 51 Cal.2d .......333 P.2d 757 (1958).
4 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
G See Edmonds v. County of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.2d 642, 255 P.2d 772 (1953) ; Frebank
Co. v. White, 152 Cal. App. 2d 522, 313 P.2d 633 (1957); Wade v. Markwell & Co., 118 Cal.
App. 2d 410, 258 P.2d 497 (1953); West v. Hunt Foods Co., 101 Cal. App. 2d 597, 255 P.2d
978 (1951); Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 197 P.2d 807 (1948); 18 CAr.. JUR. 2d
407-408 (1953); 5 STAw. L. REv. 783 (1953).
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right to revoke its offer had been precluded by the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
The making of an offer implies a subsidiary promise that it shall remain open
until terminated or accepted. 6 An offer may be terminated by the passage of time.7
Where no time is specified, the law will impute to the offeror an intent that the
offer remain open for a reasonal time.8 In a situation such as the Drennan case, a
reasonable time would require that the plaintiff be afforded an opportunity to con-
sider and accept the offered services.
It is upon this implied subsidiary promise which plaintiff relied in including
defendant's bid in the master bid. There was no consideration given for this prom-
ise. Thus, it would normally have been revocable.9 The question here is whether or
not the offeree's justifiable reliance upon the subsidiary promise to his substantial
detriment might serve as a substitute for consideration and make the promise
irrevocable.
It was manifestly to defendant's advantage that plaintiff consider defendant's
bid "firm" and it should have known that there was a substantial possibility that
its bid would be the lowest for the paving. Defendant should have foreseen not
only that the promise might induce the plaintiff to act to his detriment, but also the
precise nature of plaintiff's act and its consequences. That the promise did in fact
induce plaintiff to act is indicated by the evidence. Plaintiff used defendant's bid
as well as its name in submitting the master bid. There was a showing of substan-
tial difference between defendant's bid and the cost of the paving to plaintiff.
Since the master bid had been taken and in fact fully performed by plaintiff,
there was no way the court could have put these parties into positions substantially
similiar to those they enjoyed prior to their ill-fated negotiations. That is, they
could not be returned to "status quo." Nor, as things stood, was there any relation-
ship existing between the parties which would give plaintiff any basis for redress.
It would appear that the only course by which injustice could be averted was that
taken by the court. In enforcing defendant's implied subsidiary promise to hold
the offer open, the court rendered defendant's purported revocation of its bid inef-
fective. This made plaintiff's prompt acceptance of the bid binding upon defen-
dant. Thus the parties were put into a contractual relationship, the breach of which
by defendant gave plaintiff a cause of action for damages.
Historically, promissory estoppel developed as a means to enforce gifts of in-
terests in land, charitable subscriptions and gratuitous bailments.' 0 The tendency
was to limit the doctrine as closely as possible to those cases. Gradually it was ex-
tended to include other types of gratuitous or donative promises. In Baird v. Gim-
ble it was argued that the doctrine should be extended to a promise given for an
exchange.
In deciding the Baird case, Judge Learned Hand first dismissed the contention
that plaintiff's use of defendant's bid in its compilation of the general bid could
6 1 WnL=sTON, CONTRACTS § 25, at 57 (3d ed. 1958) ; id. § 50; REsTATEmrmT, CONTRAC=S
§ 35 (1932). See 1 WILnISTON, CoNTRACTs § 61 (3d ed. 1958).
7 REsTATE)LNT, CONTRACTS § 35 (1) (b) (1932).
8 McKay v. Rochester & Lake Ontario Water Service Corp., 272 N.Y. 528, 4 N.E. 2d 432
(1936); 12 CA,. JuR. 2d Contracts § 20 (1953); 1 CoRBUN, CONTRACTS § 36 (1950); 1 W.uS-
ToN, CONTRACTS § 54 (3d ed. 1958).
9 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTS § 35 (1) (e) (1932).
1OU.PA.L.fV. 459 (1950).
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constitute acceptance." He then considered the argument that promissory estoppel
should apply to the offer to supply at the bid price. He reasoned that an offer for
an exchange is not meant to become enforceable until the stipulated consideration
has been received. The parties presuppose that each promise or performance is
the inducement for the other. Hand concluded that, "to extend [the doctrine of
promissory estoppel to an offer for an exchange] would be to hold the offeror re-
gardless of the stipuated condition of his offer." Thus Hand would limit the doc-
trine to donative promises.
In his third point Hand considered and rejected the possibility that an option
had been raised. But he pointed out that if the bid could be so construed as to in-
clude the offer of an option, "the doctrine of 'promissory estoppel' might apply,
the plaintiff having acted in reliance upon it,... As to that, however, we need not
declare ourselves." In this way, Hand left open the question of the applicability of
promissory estoppel to a gratuitous subsidiary promise to hold an offer open after
correctly pointing out that the cases were against it.' 2
The Drennan case agrees with Baird that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
should not apply to a promise given for an exchange and that it can apply to a
promise to keep the offer open. But here Traynor differed with Hand and held that
the doctrine should apply whether or not the cases were against it.'3
The result in this case is supported by analogy with the cases decided accord-
ing to section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts. Section 45 provides that if an
offer for a unilateral contract is made and part of the bargained for consideration
is performed or tendered in response thereto, the offeror is bound on a contract
the duty of immediate performance of which is conditional on the full considera-
tion being performed or tendered within the time stated by the offer or, no time
stated, within a reasonable time.' 4 Here, also, no contract is formed by part per-
formance in reliance on the offeror's promise. Rather, the offeree's "option" to
accept by full performance is made irrevocable. The subsidiary promise not to
revoke has been made binding by the offeree's detrimental reliance thereon.
The doctrine as applied in Drennan should give substance and meaning to so
called "firm" offers and should afford protection for those who, by the very nature
of their business must be able to rely upon such offers. The construction industry
offers an excellent example of a business in which very often one must have a reli-
able "firm offer" a considerable time before he is in position to accept it.
Mr. Justice Traynor noted that "the general contractor is not free to delay
acceptance after the bid has been awarded nor to reopen negotiations with the sub-
contractor and still claim a continuing right to accept the original offer."' 5 This
and the strict language of section 90 should sufficiently limit the doctrine to pro-
tect from abuse sub-contractors and others whose dealings will come within its
scope under the rule laid down in the Drennan case.
James R. Slaybaugh
11The Baird and Drennan cases are not distinguishable on their facts. Plaintiff in Baird
was a general contractor and defendant a sub-contractor in the same respective positions as
Drennan and the Star Paving Co.
12 Corbett v. Cronkhite, 239 Ill. 9, 87 N.E. 874 (1909) ; Sharpless v. Kirk Gas & Smelting
Co., 128 Kan. 722, 280 Pac. 788 (1929) ; Bancroft v. Martin, 144 Mass. 384, 109 So. 859 (1926);
Texas Co. v. Dunn, 219 S.W. 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
13 See Gordon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941), and Northwestern
Engineering Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 408, 10 N.W.2d 879 (1943).
1 4 
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 45, comment b (1932); RFSTATEMENT IN THE CoUwrs,
CONTRAcTs § 45 (perm. ed. 1945).
15 Daum Construction Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952).
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